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Abstract
People’s preferences for state intervention in social policies vary. A cross-section
analysis on individual-level survey data is conducted here to highlight the link be-
tween the economic position of agents and their specific demand for redistribution.
Controlling for a number of factors usually found to affect individual preferences
in the literature, the egoistic motives for redistribution are taken seriously and this
article focuses on the role played by the occupational status of individuals in shap-
ing their preferences. Thus, the relative importance of economic factors in terms of
current and expected gains is estimated, taking into account individuals’ experience
of social mobility and risk aversion. Furthermore, the research presented here iden-
tifies which socio-political groups may be formed on the basis of their preferences
for redistribution.
Keywords: Redistribution, Occupation, Social mobility, Ordered logit regression
JEL classification: D31, D72, H23
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1 Introduction
What explains people’s preferences for redistributive policies? In this paper, I con-
duct a cross-country analysis of the determinants of preferences for redistribution, using
individual-level survey data. The egoistic motives for redistribution are taken seriously
and the relative importance of economic factors is estimated in terms of current and
expected gain, allowing for social mobility concerns and risk aversion. To this end, data
from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2006 Role of Government IV
module) is used. Our sample is composed of 33 democracies. The empirical validity of
the main propositions of the literature are tested, using ordered logit regressions. The
relative importance of each explanatory variable is substantively assessed and robustness
checks are carried out.
Throughout the analysis, I focus on the role played by individuals’ occupational status
in shaping their preferences for redistribution. Adopting a political economy viewpoint
on the more general question of what determines redistributive policies, the research
here seeks to identify which socio-political groups may be formed on the basis of their
preferences for redistribution. Indeed, the changing weight of social groups and the degree
of homogeneity that exists inside groups crucially influences the policy outcome.1 The
analysis of demand concerning social policies and the identification of social groups that
formulate this demand are then necessary to determine the support for potential reforms
concerning the welfare state, from a comparative perspective (Castanheira et al., 2006).
There is a rapidly growing literature on the determinants of preferences for redistri-
bution, with a large variety of arguments proposed to explain differences in attitudes
1On this point see the political economy model of Pagano and Volpin (2001, 2005).
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towards the welfare state. This goes from purely pecuniary factors (Meltzer and Richard,
1981) to purely cultural factors (Algan and Cahuc, 2006), through subjective social po-
sitioning (Hirschman, 1973), or expectations of social mobility (Benabou and Ok, 2001).
The present contribution to the existing literature is twofold: (i) it substantively assesses
the importance of the variables identified in the literature, inferring a hierarchy in the
arguments and emphasizing the supremacy of economic factors in shaping preferences
for redistribution; (ii) it identifies the different social groups (hence potential coalitions)
which might support redistribution according to their position in the labour market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature on the determinants
of preferences for redistribution. Section 3 explains the empirical strategy applied here,
the data and the careful construction of variables. Section 4 illustrates the econometric
results, while Section 5 conducts a series of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
A recent body of the economic literature addresses the problem of the formation of
preferences for redistribution.2
The standard viewpoint is to consider a purely pecuniary factor as determining indi-
vidual preferences (Meltzer and Richard, 1981): individuals whose income is below the
mean income of the population ask for redistribution, given that they will directly ben-
efit from it. Symmetrically, individuals whose income is above the mean do not favour
redistribution, as they are net contributors. Therefore, if the median income is below the
mean income in the population, a majority of voters will be in favour of redistribution.
2See the recent survey by Alesina and Giuliano (2009).
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In their study of the differences between the level of welfare state in the United States
and in four European countries (France, Germany, Sweden and the UK), Alesina and
Glaeser (2004) show that the empirical validity of this argument is highly controversial.
Adding the “prospect of upward mobility” to enrich the standard model and assuming
that a change in politics cannot happen too often, Benabou and Ok (2001) leave a room
for individuals whose income is just below the mean to rationally oppose redistributive
policies. Then, there may be a “preference for inequality” (Suhrcke, 2001) linked to
the fact that a majority of voters expect to experience upward mobility in the future,
and hence a net cost of redistribution (Clark, 2003; Senik, 2005). A similar argument
has recently been tested by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), using an objective mobility
matrix.
This raises the question of how individuals estimate their chances of future mobility.
Piketty (1995) assumes a learning process that leads individuals to take into account
not only their current income, but also their personal mobility history to compute their
future income. Using their personal experience of mobility, individuals, who do not
know the true role of effort in determining income, update their initial beliefs (randomly
distributed) while evaluating the cost of redistribution. Therefore, an individual who be-
lieves that effort is rewarded by society and who experiences upward mobility would have
an incentive to oppose any redistributive policy and to pursue his/her effort to increase
his/her social position. These beliefs are self-fulfilling, in the long run.3 They imply
multiple equilibria leading the US, for instance, to promote effort (and thus to oppose
redistribution) and European countries to reward chance (thus favouring redistributive
3See Piketty (1998) for a theoretical explanation of the persistence of inequalities.
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policies). The standard income effect usually assumed in Public Choice theories with
an egoistic median voter may thus be false, since the effect comes from endogenous be-
liefs about the role of effort.4 More recently, Fong (2001), Alesina and Angeletos (2005)
and Benabou and Tirole (2006) have revisited the relationship between collective beliefs
about the relative importance of individual effort in personal success and the demand for
redistribution.
Relative income also has a role in determining preferences, as pointed out by Ravallion
and Lokshin (2000), who take advantage of the “tunnel effect” put forward by Hirschman
(1973). In this approach, beliefs are strongly related to the way other people evolve in
the society. The tunnel refers to a situation in which the driver of a car is stuck in a
traffic jam. If traffic in the next lane is moving faster, the individual first has a positive
reaction: the traffic jam is probably coming to an end, and his/her lane will accelerate
very soon, too. But if, after a while, the lane remains stuck, the individual is not only
unsatisfied, but his/her discontent is raised by the fact that drivers in the adjacent lane
are moving on. This twofold effect is called the tunnel effect. Attitudes of individuals
clearly depend on their expectations, and their expectations rely on the observation of
others. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) and Corneo and Gru¨ner (2000, 2002) find empirical
support for this relative social mobility argument, using Russian data for the former, and
international survey data (ISSP 1992) for the latter.
Finally, a growing body of the literature focuses on behavioural and cultural values
as determinants of preferences for redistribution.5 Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007)
4See Piketty (1999) for a test on French data.
5See Algan and Cahuc (2006) for an international comparison using the World Value Survey and ISSP
(1991, 1998) that explains differences in welfare states and labour market institutions by differences in
civic attitudes. See Amable (2009) for an empirical evaluation of European Social Survey data of the
importance of cultural factors relative to other “materialist” factors in the individual support for the
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argue that there is a long lasting impact of political regimes on collective beliefs about
redistribution. The authors take advantage of the natural experiment of East Germany
to assess the impact of Communism on people’s preferences for redistribution. Alesina,
Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) and Roemer and Van der Straeten (2005, 2006) focus
on the racial conflict that could explain the refusal of redistribution, when individuals
expect migrants to get all the benefits from it. Clark and Lelkes (2005) and Scheve and
Stasavage (2006) highlight the role of religion as a substitute to public redistribution.
The hypothesis tested by the authors is that the social distress due to an economic shock
(e.g. unemployment) is dampened if the individual belongs to a social network. Religion
might be such a network.6 In all these studies, the insurance motive of redistributive
policies (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) is also tackled.7
The research here tests the empirical validity of these propositions on an extensive
set of countries, that includes not only advanced industrial democracies, but also for-
mer communist countries and Latin American countries. Adopting a political economy
viewpoint on the more general question of what determines redistributive policies, it
seeks to identify which socio-political groups could be formed on the basis of their pref-
erences for redistribution. Throughout the analysis, the hypothesis is that preferences
for redistribution rely on the economic positioning of agents in the labour market. Thus,
conducting a cross-country analysis of the determinants of preferences for redistribution,
the paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it assesses the relative
importance of the factors identified in affecting preferences for redistribution and reveals
European social model.
6Indeed, Clark and Lelkes (2005) have shown that religious individuals experience significantly lower
estimated losses in subjective utility after adverse life events, such as unemployment.
7See Rehm (2005) for an empirical test on European Social Survey data of diverse insurance motives
(globalization, deindustrialization) as determinants of preferences for redistribution.
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the key role played by economic variables, as compared to cultural factors. Second, the
research identifies the different occupational groups which might support redistributive
policies.
3 Empirical Strategy
The present analysis highlights the link between the economic position of agents and
their specific demand concerning redistribution. It focuses on the role played by the
occupational status of individuals in shaping their preferences for redistribution. Indeed,
taking the egoistic motives for redistribution seriously, the attitudes of individuals are
examined according to their (perceived) position in the labour market. More specifically,
the aim is to estimate the relative importance of economic factors in terms of current and
expected gain, allowing for social mobility concerns and risk aversion. From a political
economy perspective, the aim is also to identify which socio-political groups can be formed
on the basis of their preferences for redistribution.
3.1 Data
The micro-econometric analysis here is based on the ISSP dataset “Role of Government
IV” (International Social Survey Programme - 2006). Questions of the survey deal with
the political demand, votes, social and economic characteristics of individuals. More
specifically, the Role of Government IV module aims to identify individual attitudes
toward government responsibilities and government spending. The large size and coverage
of the data (on average 1500 respondents per country, over 33 democracies) gives the
opportunity to produce precise estimates of what determines individual preferences for
8
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redistribution. The following OECD countries are included in the dataset: Switzerland,
Germany (East and West), Danemark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, USA,
Israel (Jewish and Arabs), Chile, South Korea, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and
Slovenia. In addition, the dataset provides data on Croatia, Latvia, Russia, Philippines,
Taiwan, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, and South Africa.
To measure attitudes towards redistribution, agents are assumed to be sincere reveal-
ers of their preferences, in answering to the following survey question:
“On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s
responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor?”
For presentational purposes, the original scale has been inverted, placing critics and
supports of redistribution in four categories: 1 Definitely should not be, 2 Probably
should not be, 3 Probably should be, 4 Definitely should be. The distribution of answers
is shown in Tables 1 and 2 below.
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]
Series of further explanatory variables are selected from the dataset, each of which
corresponds to a possible explanation for the formulation of preferences. The causal link
involved is briefly exposed below.
Occupation ISCO-88 (International Standard Classification of Occupations): The type
of occupation, which depends on skills levels and specialization, is assumed to influence
preferences of agents regarding social policies. Indeed, according to Iversen and Soskice
(2001), specific jobs are more threatened by globalization and macro shocks than others.
9
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Moreover, specialized workers have greater difficulties in finding vacancies that correspond
to their specialty (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). Consequently, agents with specific skills are
supposed to be more supportive of the welfare state, compared to agents with general
skills.8 The ISCO indicator is clustered here into the 9 major groups, indicated by the
ILO (1990) and strongly related to individuals’ education degree and their level of on-
the-job training. Importantly, by entering major occupation groups as binary variables
into the regression analysis, it is possible to assess which occupations can be grouped
together according to the similarity of their political demands. The major groups used
are the following: Manager, Professional, Associate professional, Clerk, Service worker,
Agricultural worker, Craftsman, Machine operator, Elementary worker.9
Income The higher an individual’s income, the less he/she needs public funding, hence
the less he/she should favour redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). On the other
hand, the higher an individual’s income, the more he/she has to lose when becoming
unemployed, if he/she does not earn sufficient replacement benefits. Hence, the linearity
of an individual’s preferences for redistribution is not theoretically obvious and calls
for more precise empirical testing (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). Therefore, current
income enters the regression in quintiles, from the lowest (Q1) to the highest (Q5) level
of income.10
8To test their argument, the authors construct a linear skill specificity index based on the ISCO
classification. However, I do not see any reason why all specific skills - by definition specific to a job
or sector - would be threatened in the same way by globalization or macro shocks. Thus, the linearity
of the effect does not seem intuitive. Moreover, the skill specificity index of the authors is negatively
related to the level of education of workers (Cusack et al., 2006, p.371).
9Given the small size and the heterogeneous composition of the group of agricultural workers, the
same analysis excluding this group was conducted, as a robustness check. Results remain unchanged.
10To achieve international comparability, the actual position of individuals in the income distribution
of their country is considered here, instead of the level of income per se. This income distribution has
been normalised in quintiles. However, keeping the original coding in terms of income level would not
change the results.
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Risk Aversion The employment status (workers in the private sector, self-employed and
publicly employed) is used as proxy for risk aversion. Self-employed workers are supposed
to be less risk-averse than average (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), while publicly employed
people are supposed to be more risk-averse than average. Indeed, public employees are
less likely to lose their jobs: job tenure is guaranteed more in the public sector than in the
private sector. Assuming they follow a decision-making process while choosing their job
status, those individuals who have chosen to be publicly employed should correspond to
more risk-averse people. Furthermore, the level of public employment directly relies on
the size of government, and more particularly on the size of social programs. Therefore,
public employees have a direct interest in supporting redistributive policies.
Unions Membership of a trade union or an employers’ association is taken into account
using a dummy. The idea is that union members are better informed about the costs
and benefits of redistribution. Moreover, union members are supposedly willing to influ-
ence public policy decisions, by giving power to an organization that expresses common
interests (Olson, 1965).
Religion Religious denomination (dummies for Catholic, Protestant, and Other religion)
and church attendance are used to assess the validity of the result found in the literature,
as applied to the sample used here (Clark and Lelkes, 2005; Scheve and Stasavage, 2006).
Social Class In order to infer the potential impact of the subjective social ranking on
attitudes towards redistribution, self-positioning values by agents of how they rank them-
selves on a social scale from 1 (top) to 10 (bottom) are used. Two binary variables are
defined: upper class (positioning from 1 to 4) and lower class (from 7 to 10). Individuals
who position themselves on the 5th and 6th ranks are considered to belong to the middle
11
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class (the reference category here). It may thus be expected that individuals who express
the feeling of belonging to the upper class have a more negative attitude towards redis-
tribution, while individuals having the feeling of belonging to the lower class will have a
more positive attitude, relative to those who belong to the middle class.11
Social Mobility Two different specifications are used to assess the social mobility argu-
ment.12 The first one is the self-assessment by individuals of their job prestige, compared
to their father’s. This specification may also be found in Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002) and
in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). The second specification used is the personal history
of individuals, concerning their social mobility. To construct this variable, the previous
question on the self-positioning of individuals on a social scale is used. Indeed, the ques-
tion is asked twice, for the present (today) and regarding the past: 10 years ago (an
ex post assessment). The difference between both answers is calculated to measure the
subjective social mobility of respondents and to classify the newly created variable into 3
categories (upward mobility, immobility, and downward mobility). This is a direct test of
the argument by Piketty (1995) stating that people who have experienced upward mobil-
ity should oppose redistribution, while people who have experienced downward mobility
11Two remarks should be made, concerning the incorporation of this variable into the model. On the
one hand, the subjective feeling of belonging to a certain social class is highly correlated to objective
variables of job occupation and family income. It may be noted indeed that the introduction of the
social class variable decreases the coefficients of occupation and income, although it does not strongly
affect their significance. On the other hand, two individuals who have the same occupation and a similar
family income may have different views of their social position. The self-positioning of an individual on
the social ladder thus captures the feeling he/she has regarding his/her relative ranking, hence his/her
vision of the society in which he/she lives (this could even act as a proxy of personal social satisfaction).
12The effect of this explanatory variable is estimated on a different dataset: the ISSP 1999 module,
Social Inequality III, is used here. Indeed, for data availability reasons, it was not possible to address
this social mobility issue in the ISSP 2006 module. Consequently, the dependent variable slightly dif-
fers, although its interpretation is closely related to the one of the question used in our main dataset.
Individuals are asked whether they agree with the following statement: “It is the responsability of the
government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low
incomes.” Respondents can choose among five answers: 1 Strongly disagree, 2 Disagree, 3 Neither agree
nor disagree, 4 Agree, 5 Strongly agree. As before, the scale has been inverted for presentational reasons.
12
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should support redistribution. The reference category here gathers people who consider
they did not experience any mobility within the last 10 years.
The following variables are introduced as a control set: gender (dummy for female),
age and age squared (to allow for concavity), and marital status (dummy for individuals
who are married or live as married).
An important variable that could have been introduced into the analysis is the educa-
tion level of individuals. However, as it is already included in the ISCO variable used, it
has not been included in the regression to avoid multicollinearity. Yet, if tested separately,
it is found to have the same result as in the literature: the more educated an individual is,
the less he/she favours redistribution.13 Finally, another interesting explanatory variable
would be the work status of individuals (unemployed, disabled, retired, part-time, etc.).
Unfortunately, the high number of missing points on this question ruled out using this
set of variables in the regression.
3.2 Estimation Process
The next step is to carry out an ordered logit regression, since the variable to be explained
encompasses discrete choices that can be easily ordered on a Likert scale.14 Ordered mod-
13The explanation for this is twofold. First, the more individuals study, the more they are informed,
and hence the more they know about the cost and benefits of redistribution. Second, the more an
individual studies, the higher his/her productivity and wage, thus the more he/she pays taxes while
employed. Therefore, support for redistribution falls as it represents a net cost to the individual. Also,
if it is assumed that long-term unemployment risks fall with education, then this effect is emphasized.
14The Likert scale is commonly used to measure individuals’ degree of satisfaction. This type of scale
uses a classification in 5 points that ranges from strong agreement to simple agreement, indifference,
disagreement, and strong disagreement in order to rank attitudes. Even though some scholars treat this
scale as being an interval scale (hence applying OLS estimates), it is not known whether the distances
between the different alternatives are equal (i.e. the gap between “strongly agree” and “agree” is not
necessarily of the same magnitude as the gap between “agree” and “indifferent”). Therefore, the presence
of a Likert scale calls for the use of categorical dependent variable regression models (CDVMs). Unlike
OLS models, CDVMs are not linear.
13
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els assume the existence of threshold values, thus implying an ordering to the categories
of the dependent variable. More precisely, a latent variable is supposed to capture the
outcome, following a decision rule based on the cut-point parameters that need to be
estimated.
The equation to be estimated can be defined as follows:
Y ∗i = γDi + χEi + δMi + φVi + ηC + i (1)
where vectors γ, χ, δ, φ, η and  are parameters to be estimated, and Y ∗i is the latent
variable, i.e. the intensity of preferences for redistribution.
D is a vector of individual socio-demographic characteristics (age, sex, marital status).
E is a vector that measures the socio-economic position of individuals (type of occupation,
current income, risk aversion). This vector includes also a binary variable for individuals
who are trade union members. M is a vector of binary variables that captures the personal
experience of social mobility and the perception of mobility relative to the individual’s
father, or alternatively the subjective social position. V is a vector of dummies that
captures cultural values, reduced here to the religion of individuals and the intensity of
their religiosity. As far as Germany is concerned, a dummy for living in former East
Germany is included, in order to capture a potential long lasting effect of the communist
regime on preferences. Finally, C is a vector of country dummies, and  is the error term.
It is not Y ∗i which is observed, but a variable Yi that takes values from 1 to 5, and
increases with the individual support for redistribution. In particular, we have:
Yi = j if αj−1 ≤ Y ∗i < αj (2)
14
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for j = 1, ..., 5 where αj are cut points to estimate, assuming that α0 = −∞ and
α5 = +∞.
The interpretation of categorical variables estimates is not straightforward. Coeffi-
cients give us the marginal effect of a unit variation of the independent variable on the
value of the latent variable. However, the value of the latent variable is not known, but
only its cut points. Therefore, a first interpretation of results is carried out through the
interpretation of the sign of coefficients and of their statistical significance. It should be
noted that the magnitude of coefficients is comparable, within the same regression. We
thus interpret the relative impact of independent variables in terms of odds ratios (i.e.
for a unit increase in x, the odds of a lower outcome compared with a higher outcome
are changed by a β factor, holding all other variables constant). The substantive effect of
coefficients is further assessed by computing predicted probabilities for a few ideal types
(Long and Freese, 2006).
4 Results
To begin with, a pooled country regression was run that constrains the residual variance to
be the same, hence assuming the homogeneity of unobserved variables. While presenting
the results of the estimates elaborated here, an odds ratio was specifically provided to
compare the impact of explanatory variables in a meaningful way. Indeed, a unit increase
in xk is interpreted as a change in the odds of a lower outcome compared with a higher
outcome by a factor βk, holding all other variables constant. Subsequently a few ideal
types were put forward and the predicted probabilities of falling into one or another
category of the dependent variables were computed. The econometric results for the
15
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pooled country regressions, using the ordered logit estimation technique, are provided in
Table 3. The predicted probabilities are gathered in Tables 4 and 5 for six different ideal
types.
In the regression Table, column [1] presents the baseline model, which includes only ex-
planatory variables linked to the labour market (occupation, income, employment status,
and union membership) and the usual control variables (socio-demographic characteris-
tics, and country dummies). Columns [2] and [3] extend the baseline model with variables
related to religion. These include the frequency of church attendance (column [2]) and
the religious denomination (column [3]). The aim is here to test the validity of arguments
emphasizing the role of religion in the formation of preferences for redistribution. Column
[4] extends the baseline model by incorporating dummy variables for the social class of
individuals (upper class, lower class). Our reference category is the middle class. Finally,
columns [5] and [6] test the arguments linked to the role of subjective social mobility in
the formation of preferences for redistribution. More particularly, column [5] tests the
argument of intergenerational mobility, while column [6] tests the impact of personal mo-
bility history on preferences for redistribution. Following the baseline model throughout
the different regressions allows the robustness of the impact of economic variables to be
assessed.
[Table 3 about here]
4.1 The Supremacy of Economic Factors
Running an ordered logit regression on pooled country data (Table 3) clearly indicates
that the economic factors identified in the previous discussion do play a crucial role in
16
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determining preferences for redistribution (occupation, income, and risk aversion). Not
surprisingly, family income is a good predictor of preferences: the higher it is, the lower
an individual’s support for redistribution.15 This is a simple revenue effect: wealthier
individuals are directly burdened by redistributive policies, while low income should gain
from them. The result also implies that the supposed insurance effect remains relatively
modest compared to the revenue effect.
The proxies for risk aversion are also shown to have an important effect on preferences
for redistribution. Self-employed workers, who are supposed to be less risk-averse than
dependent employees, are indeed less in favour of redistribution: their odds of having
more negative attitudes toward redistribution are 1.16 times (16%) larger than dependent
employees. In contrast, more risk-averse people, proxied by public employees in the
sample, appear to be strongly and significantly in favour of redistributive policies: their
odds of having more positive attitudes towards redistribution are 1.23 times (23%) higher
than workers in the private sector.
Finally, the type of occupation that individuals exercise is also a good predictor of
their preferences, even after controlling for income. Indeed, in all specifications, the occu-
pation indicator used here is strongly and significantly related to the dependent variable.
The coefficients are interpreted relative to the reference category, represented by office
Clerks. Thus, the negative and significant coefficients of Managers, Professionals and
Associate professionals indicate that individuals who belong to these types of occupation
15The result of the Chow test (H0: equal coefficients) for income quintiles is χ2(3) = 13.25, p < 0.01.
It means that the categories of income are not evenly spaced, and so income should not be treated as
an interval scale variable. This implies that an increase from the first quintile of income to the second
quintile of income does not involve a similar decrease in the probability of favour redistribution, as an
increase from the second quintile to the third quintile of income. This is the reason why income quintiles
are entered separately into the regression.
17
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are clearly less in favour of redistribution than Clerks: based on column [1], the odds
of having more negative attitudes toward redistribution are 1.4 times (40%) higher for
Managers than for Clerks, 1.3 times (30%) higher for Professionals than for Clerks, and
1.14 times (14%) higher for Associate professionals than for Clerks. By contrast, Ser-
vice workers, Craftsmen, Machine operators and Elementary workers are much more in
favour of redistribution than Clerks: Their odds of having more positive attitudes to-
ward redistribution are increased by, respectively, 15%, 17%, 25% and 17% compared to
Clerks. Agricultural workers have attitudes toward redistribution that cannot be distin-
guished from those of Clerks (non-significant coefficient). The results clearly suggest that
a straight ordering of occupation categories may be relevant: the less skills an individual
has, the higher his/her probability of favouring redistributive policies. Results further
suggest that a grouping of occupation categories might be constituted, according to the
proximity of their coefficients: (i) Service workers, Craftsmen, Elementary workers and
Machine operators do have the same attitudes towards redistribution; and their attitudes
differ to those of (ii) Agricultural workers and Clerks; and finally, (iii) Associate profes-
sionals, Professionals and Managers form another group, which holds similar attitudes
towards redistribution.
4.2 Religion Acts as a Possible Substitute for Redistribution
Columns [2] and [3] introduce variables on church attendance and religious denomination,
respectively. The results confirm the argument of Scheve and Stasavage (2006): religion
seems to act as a substitute for redistributive policies. Being Catholic increases the odds
of having more negative attitudes toward redistribution by 7%, while being Protestant
18
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increases it by 13%, relative to having no religion. According to the literature, this could
be due to an insurance effect of religious communities that lessens the social distress of
individuals, and hence their need for redistribution, potentially through network exter-
nalities.16 However, figures on church attendance do not confirm this result. Therefore,
given that religion has a strong effect when it comes to religious denomination, but that
this effect vanishes when one considers church attendance, one might argue that the
pathway is ideological, not via actual social support.17
4.3 The Affects of Individuals’ Social Self-ranking on their Sup-
port for Redistribution
Column [4] introduces the subjective belonging to a social class.18 The idea is to capture
the differentiated impact on preferences of an individual’s feeling of belonging to the upper
or to the lower class. Not surprisingly, individuals who express the feeling of belonging
to the upper class are less inclined to favour redistribution than those who subjectively
belong to the middle class (the reference category here): their odds of having more
negative attitudes toward redistribution rises by 25%. However, the symmetry is not
true: no significant effect is found for individuals who (subjectively) belong to the lower
class.
16The category “other religion” represents 20% of the sample. However, it is very heterogenous.
Indeed, each religion listed in it represents less than 3% of the sample (except for Christian Orthodoxes
that represent 5% of the sample). The coefficient of this category is not significant. One might thus
argue that religion is important in shaping preferences for redistribution, providing that it is a major
religion in the country. It has been tested here, but results do not validate this interpretation.
17(I thank an anonymous reviewer for having suggested this second interpretation.)
18Great Britain is excluded from this specification, since it has no observations on the social class
variable.
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4.4 The Strong Impact of Subjective Social Mobility on Pref-
erences for Redistribution
Columns [5] and [6] introduce the social mobility argument. Two different specifications
are tested. The first (column [5]) tries to capture the effect of intergenerational social mo-
bility in a family context. Surprisingly, the coefficient of job prestige is positive (however,
not significant).19
The second specification of social mobility (column [6]) has a more straightforward
interpretation. Individual perceptions of personal upward or downward mobility within
the last ten years are used. The reference category encompasses those individuals who
have experienced no social mobility. Coefficients have the expected signs: individuals
who have the feeling of having experienced upward mobility are less supportive of re-
distributive policies than people who have not experienced any mobility, whereas people
who have experienced downward mobility within the last ten years are more in favour
of redistribution. The odds of the former having a more negative attitude toward re-
distribution are higher by 21%, while the odds of the latter of having a more positive
attitude toward redistribution are up by 32%. It may again be noted that this is not an
objective indicator of social mobility, but a subjective one, although the effect is highly
significant.20
19Taking this result seriously would mean that an individual who considers his job as more prestigious
than his father’s would still be inclined to have a more positive attitude towards redistributive policies.
Apart from intergenerational altruism, such behaviour could be due to a long-lasting impact of family
experience (an influence of the parents’ social position on the beliefs and attitudes of children). Such a
result, if significant, would consistent with the argument of Piketty (1995) about endogenous beliefs of
individuals.
20For the use of objective indicators of social mobility, see the contribution of Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005).
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4.5 Socio-demographic Controls and Country Dummies
Whereas being married (or living as married) has no significant effect on preferences for
redistribution, being a female clearly increases the probability of having more favourable
attitudes towards redistribution (up by 16%, according to the baseline model). As for
age, no significant effect is identified.
Turning now to country dummies, the puzzle is the following. The United States is
the reference category here. The positive and highly significant coefficients for Sweden
and Norway mean that living in one of these countries leads individuals to adopt more
positive attitudes towards redistribution (the odds of holding positive attitudes are higher
by 29% and 30%, respectively), as compared to American citizens, all other things being
equal. The difference between Danemark and the USA is not significant. It should be
noted here that all former communist countries do hold extremely high and significant
coefficients. For instance, living in Poland, Russia or East Germany inceases the odds of
holding positive attitudes by 381%, 256%, and 238% respectively. We meet up here with
Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007) result on the long lasting impact of political regimes
on collective preferences.21
21However, country dummies do not give any information on the reason why this is so. Indeed,
they simply have the role of “capturing” potentially-omitted, country-specific variables, which might
have an impact on the preferences of individuals for redistribution (the level of income inequality, the
actual redistribution policy, the unemployment rate, the demographic situation, etc.). Including country
dummies in the regressions thus helps to produce unbiased estimates of our variables of interest. The
fact that country dummies do have significant coefficients means that there are, indeed, differentiated
national attitudes. These dummies are like “black boxes”, whose information needs to be extracted
manually. It might thus be appropriate to run separated regressions for each country (see Section 5
below).
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4.6 Gathering the Results
Before turning to the predicted probabilities, the results are gathered to get a general
picture of what determines preferences for redistribution.
First, the analysis confirms the importance of a pure revenue effect on preferences.
Work occupation, family income, subjective social class or expected social mobility all
point in the same direction: the poorer an individual (objectively or subjectively), the
more supportive he/she is of redistribution. These attitudes towards redistribution are
linked to the economic position of individuals in the labour market.
Second, risk aversion (risk willingness) of individuals has a significant impact on their
attitudes toward redistribution. Indeed, looking at the employment status of individuals
shows that being publicly employed significantly increases the probability of supporting
redistribution, while being self-employed decreases it.
Third, the political backgrounds of individuals affect their policy preferences for redis-
tribution. Evidence is found for the fact that the political regime may have a long lasting
effect on collective preferences. A related question is whether religion plays an active role
in shaping preferences. The conclusion is far from clear: according to the results found
here, Catholics and Protestants tend to oppose redistribution.
4.7 The Predicted Probabilities
To illustrate the results further, predicted probabilities are used to assess the relative
importance of a few independent variables. Using Table 3 allows six ideal types to be
constructed and their predicted probabilities of having different attitudes toward redis-
tribution to be computed. The first two ideal types, based on model [1], represent a
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manager (Type 1) versus an elementary worker (Type 2). The next two ideal types, also
based on model [1], are a self-employed worker (Type 3) and a publicly employed worker
(Type 4). The results of these four ideal types are shown in Table 4. There is clearly a
strong impact by occupation on the outcomes predicted, as well as risk aversion.
[Table 4 about here]
The last two ideal types, based on model [5] which includes social mobility, repre-
sent an average individual, who has experienced upward mobility (Type 5) or downward
mobility (Type 6). An average individual has about a 3 to 4% probability of strongly
disagreeing with redistribution, about an 8 to 13% probability of disagreeing with re-
distribution, a 13 to 17% probability of having no idea about it, and a 42% probability
of agreeing with redistribution. But most importantly, he/she has 34% probability of
strongly agreeing with redistributive policies if he/she has experienced downward mo-
bility, while this probability falls to 24% if the person has experienced upward mobility
within the last 10 years. This example illustrates the non-negligible impact of personal
social mobility history on preferences for redistribution, as it was already apparent with
odds ratios.
[Table 5 about here]
5 Robustness Checks
A series of robustness checks was run, including binary regressions for the pooled data, a
test of the proportional odds assumption, and a sub-sample analysis. Results of binary
regressions are given in Table 6 in the appendix.
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5.1 The Binary Dependent Variable
As a first robustness check, the same pooled regressions were run with a binary dependent
variable. People answering that it “probably should be” or “definitely should be” the
responsibility of the government to reduce income differences were coded 1, whereas others
(including “probably should not be” and “definitely should not be” answers) were coded
0. The results are shown in the appendix (Table 6). They remain unchanged overall.
5.2 The Generalized Ordered Logit
Further, the validity of the parallel lines assumption, also called proportional odds as-
sumption (Long and Freese, 2006) is tested. Indeed, if the effect of an independent
variable on the dependent variable here is not uniform across categories, then the parallel
lines assumption is violated, leading to a fallacious interpretation of the magnitude of
the coefficient.22 The test compares slope coefficients of the J − 1 binary logits implied
by the ordered regression model. In the pooled models, the Brant test indicates that
the parallel regression assumption has been violated for some control variables (female,
country dummies). This is not considered to be a problem, as their substantive impact
is not interpreted here. Furthermore, there is some evidence that it has been violated
for the dummy representing publicly employed workers, although not changing the sign
of coefficients but only the magnitude of the impact, according to the category of the
dependent variable considered. The same issue is found for the dummy variables repre-
senting Catholics and Protestants. A generalized ordered logit estimates was thus run,
in order to assess differentiated effects of these independent variables.23 However, no
22This can be tested through the Brant test (command brant in Stata).
23Stata user-written command gologit written by Fu (1998) and extended by Williams (2006).
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valuable additional information is given by this estimation technique, which marginally
affects the magnitude of coefficients (but neither their significance, nor their sign), but
does not tackle the essential message of this study.24 Consequently, I remain confident in
the inferences made in Section 4, based on ordered logit estimates.
5.3 The Sub-sample Regressions
The necessity of running separated country regressions is finally checked. The pooled
analyses include a fixed effect for each country to allow for different, mean levels of support
for redistribution due to any number of national characteristics, including the actual
level of redistribution. However, this does not allow the effects of the other independent
variables to vary across countries, as is possible by estimating separate coefficients for each
case. Running a Chow test to assess whether coefficients remain equal between countries,
we find that the test is strongly significant.25 The hypothesis that the coefficients do
not vary between countries is thus invalidated. Moreover, running a pooled analysis with
country fixed effects does not allow to control for the fact that respondents from different
countries potentially have a different understanding of the issue at stake. This might be
an important problem, given that the long lasting effect of political regimes has already
been noted here. As a robustness check of the results presented here, the same analyses
were thus conducted on sub-samples of the data.26 In particular, OECD countries and
Eastern European countries were isolated from the rest of the sample. The main results
are confirmed by these sub-sample regressions: the type of occupation an individual
24It should be noted that the only coefficients which can be affected by this technique are those of
control variables, publicly employed, Catholic and Protestant where the parallel line assumption has
been violated. All other coefficients are left unchanged.
25Given that H0: equal coefficients, χ2(699) = 4787.18, p < 0.01
26Results of the sub-sample regressions are available upon request.
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exercises remains a key factor in the determination of preferences for redistribution, along
with the family income. This suggests the pooled estimates are not driven by a couple of
outlier countries.27
6 Conclusion
Building on a rapidly growing literature on the political economy of redistribution, I pro-
pose an empirical analysis of the determinants of individual preferences for redistributive
policies. Using individual-level survey data for 33 democracies, a series of regressions
are run to assess the main arguments of the literature. The coefficients are compared
systematically, in a meaningful way, by the use of odds ratios and predicted probabilities.
Consequently, it is possible to infer which factors are the most important in shaping at-
titudes towards redistribution, and clearly emphasize the supremacy of economic factors.
I further argue that the position of individuals in the labour market has a direct impact
on their preferences for redistribution. This appears indeed to be the case, and to be ro-
bust to a change in model specification. Hence, based on the results of these regressions,
individuals are grouped along this occupational dimension.
27However, these new estimates make clear that the grouping of individuals based on their role in the
labour market and relying on similar individual preferences for redistribution differs highly from one
sub-sample to another. Indeed, as far as Eastern European countries are concerned, (i) Managers and
Professionals hold similar attitudes towards redistribution, and these highly differ from the attitudes of
(ii) Associate professionals, office Clerks, Service workers, Craftsmen, and Machine operators. Finally, a
third social group is formed by (iii) Elementary workers. If the social coalitions are potentially different
from one country to another, this suggests that political strategies to reform the welfare state in these
countries might also differ (Castanheira et al., 2006). See the working paper version of this article, for a
comparison of groupings between European countries.
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Table 1: Distribution of answers by country
% SD D A SA Total
AU-Australia 12.77 26.72 30.22 30.29 100.00
CA-Canada 13.23 18.97 31.03 36.77 100.00
CL-Chile 1.15 7.88 34.22 56.75 100.00
TW-Taiwan 2.21 8.94 33.66 55.20 100.00
HR-Croatia 5.63 9.74 29.22 55.41 100.00
CZ-Czech Republic 16.84 28.72 32.98 21.45 100.00
DK-Denmark 18.01 26.62 25.45 29.91 100.00
DO-Dominican Republic 11.34 15.14 37.47 36.05 100.00
FI-Finland 5.62 16.41 36.17 41.80 100.00
FR-France 8.65 13.66 26.13 51.56 100.00
DE-Germany 6.65 20.95 38.47 33.93 100.00
HU-Hungary 2.36 12.10 35.49 50.05 100.00
IE-Ireland 7.45 12.99 33.87 45.69 100.00
IL-Israel 3.50 10.58 26.61 59.30 100.00
JP-Japan 12.27 21.68 31.73 34.32 100.00
KR-South Korea 3.21 16.20 40.17 40.42 100.00
LV-Latvia 3.46 13.33 44.39 38.82 100.00
NL-Netherlands 8.13 20.17 32.86 38.83 100.00
NZ-New Zealand 20.74 29.17 28.06 22.03 100.00
NO-Norway 6.46 19.21 29.53 44.80 100.00
PH-Philippines 6.45 20.32 37.01 36.22 100.00
PL-Poland 3.28 8.97 33.63 54.12 100.00
PT-Portugal 1.18 5.04 33.35 60.43 100.00
RU-Russia 2.67 11.09 33.12 53.12 100.00
SI-Slovenia 1.32 7.94 36.56 54.18 100.00
ZA-South Africa 5.88 11.23 42.43 40.46 100.00
ES-Spain 4.89 8.57 36.25 50.29 100.00
SE-Sweden 9.80 22.55 30.39 37.25 100.00
CH-Switzerland 4.88 25.75 44.13 25.23 100.00
GB-Great Britain 9.49 21.41 40.16 28.94 100.00
US-United States 21.05 26.73 23.58 28.64 100.00
UY-Uruguay 5.52 10.54 31.53 52.41 100.00
VE-Venezuela 15.82 9.70 18.44 56.03 100.00
Total 7.72 15.84 33.46 42.98 100.00
Question: “On the whole, do you think it should or should not
be the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences
between the rich and the poor?”. SD, D, A, and SA stand for
“definitely should not be”, “probably should not be”, “probably
should be”, and “definitely should be”. Source: ISSP 2006 - Role
of Government IV, and ILO (1990) for the coding of occupations.
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Table 2: Distribution of answers by occupation
% SD D A SA Total
Managers 14.22 22.80 31.61 31.38 100
Professionals 11.30 20.91 33.03 34.76 100
Associate professionals 8.89 19.48 33.63 38.01 100
Clerks 7.71 16.08 33.20 43.01 100
Service workers 5.75 14.33 32.71 47.21 100
Agricultural workers 5.99 15.25 37.24 41.52 100
Craftsmen 5.95 14.20 31.87 47.98 100
Machine operators 5.36 12.44 32.92 49.28 100
Elementary workers 4.38 10.05 35.60 49.97 100
Total sample 7.76 16.24 33.29 42.72 100
Question: “On the whole, do you think it should or should not
be the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences
between the rich and the poor?”. SD, D, A, and SA stand for
“definitely should not be”, “probably should not be”, “probably
should be”, and “definitely should be”. Source: ISSP 2006 - Role
of Government IV, and ILO (1990) for the coding of occupations.
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Table 3: Preferences for redistribution: pooled country
Ordered logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Occupation
Reference category: Clerk
Manager -.354*** -.351*** -.360*** -.364*** -.441*** -.423***
(.050) (.051) (.051) (.052) (.069) (.069)
Professional -.280*** -.278*** -.288*** -.269*** -.325*** -.318***
(.045) (.045) (.045) (.046) (.059) (.059)
Ass. professional -.139*** -.133*** -.144*** -.149*** -.137** -.152***
(.043) (.043) (.043) (.044) (.056) (.056)
Service worker .140*** .142*** .141*** .119*** .114** .107*
(.044) (.044) (.044) (.045) (.057) (.058)
Agric. worker -.085 -.075 -.091 -.119* .189** .142
(.064) (.065) (.065) (.066) (.086) (.087)
Craftsman .155*** .159*** .150*** .137*** .237*** .201***
(.047) (.048) (.047) (.048) (.059) (.060)
Machine operator .224*** .219*** .225*** .190*** .361*** .340***
(.053) (.053) (.053) (.055) (.067) (.068)
Elementary worker .158*** .158*** .153*** .116** .267*** .245***
(.046) (.046) (.046) (.048) (.062) (.063)
Income
Reference category: Family income Q5
Family income Q1 .694*** .687*** .685*** .617*** .791*** .715***
(.039) (.039) (.039) (.041) (.053) (.054)
Family income Q2 .533*** .532*** .523*** .461*** .732*** .667***
(.036) (.036) (.036) (.038) (.050) (.051)
Family income Q3 .436*** .444*** .438*** .385*** .509*** .462***
(.034) (.035) (.035) (.036) (.048) (.049)
Family income Q4 .258*** .263*** .260*** .219*** .296*** .270***
(.034) (.034) (.034) (.035) (.046) (.047)
Employment status
Self-employed -.154*** -.145*** -.153*** -.156*** -.244*** -.243***
(.034) (.034) (.034) (.034) (.050) (.051)
Publicly employed .207*** .205*** .206*** .213*** .168*** .166***
(.028) (.028) (.028) (.029) (.037) (.037)
Unions
Union membership .225*** .226*** .224*** .217*** .207*** .215***
(.027) (.027) (.027) (.028) (.038) (.038)
Demographic characteristics
Female .146*** .148*** .148*** .144*** .287*** .270***
(.023) (.024) (.024) (.024) (.031) (.031)
Age .006 .005 .005 .002 .021*** .019***
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.006) (.006)
Age-sq/100 -.004 -.003 -.003 -.000 -.017*** -.016***
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.006) (.006)
Married -.025 -.022 -.021 -.020 .013 .024
(.025) (.025) (.025) (.026) (.033) (.034)
Religion
Church attendance -.007
(.006)
Reference category: No religion
Catholic -.059*
(.035)
To be continued next page. . .
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Table 3: Preferences for redistribution: pooled country (cont’)
Ordered logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Protestant -.115***
(.036)
Other religion .040
(.041)
Social class
Reference category: Middle class
Upper class -.223***
(.031)
Lower class .029
(.027)
Social Mobility
Job prestige .039
(.030)
Reference category: No mobility
Upward mobility -.189***
(.036)
Downward mobility .276***
(.038)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Obs 31423 30852 30938 29891 17489 17199
Pseudo R-Squared .055 .055 .055 .056 .084 .087
Log Pseudolikelihood -36502.9 -35828.1 -35924.6 -34638.8 -22843.3 -22405.4
Chi 2 3935.64 3896.61 3894.25 3814.26 3500.86 3559.53
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Models [1] to [4] based on ISSP 2006, and models [5] and [6] based on ISSP 1999
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Table 4: Preferences for redistribution: predicted probabilities (oc-
cupation, risk aversion)
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Definitely should not be .09 .06 .08 .06
Probably should not be .20 .14 .18 .14
Probably should be .38 .35 .37 .35
Definitely should be .33 .45 .36 .45
Note: Based on Table 3, model [1]. Predicted probabilities for different
ideal types, holding all other variables constant at their means. De-
pendent variable: “On the whole, do you think it should or should not
be the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences between
the rich and the poor?”. Type 1: average individual, manager; Type
2: average individual, elementary worker; Type 3: average individual,
selfemployed; Type 4: average individual, publicly employed
Table 5: Preferences for redistribution: predicted probabilities (so-
cial mobility)
Type 5 Type 6
Strongly Disagree .04 .03
Disagree .13 .08
Neither agree Nor disagree .17 .13
Agree .42 .42
Strongly Agree .24 .34
Note: Based on Table 3, model [5]. Predicted probabilities for different
ideal types, holding all other variables constant at their means. Depen-
dent variable: “It is the responsability of the government to reduce the
differences in income between people with high incomes and those with
low incomes.”. Type 5: average individual, upward mobility; Type 6:
average individual, downward mobility
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A Further Results: Robustness Checks
Table 6: Preferences for redistribution (binary): pooled country
Binary logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Occupation
Reference category: Clerk
Manager -.321*** -.315*** -.329*** -.336*** -.383*** -.366***
(.061) (.062) (.062) (.063) (.080) (.081)
Professional -.232*** -.233*** -.245*** -.222*** -.234*** -.230***
(.056) (.057) (.057) (.058) (.071) (.072)
Ass. professional -.117** -.112** -.123** -.130** -.112 -.137*
(.055) (.055) (.055) (.057) (.069) (.070)
Service worker .140** .146** .136** .114* .122* .111
(.057) (.057) (.057) (.059) (.073) (.074)
Agric. worker .033 .040 .018 -.007 .305*** .253**
(.088) (.088) (.088) (.090) (.112) (.114)
Craftsman .194*** .198*** .188*** .170*** .250*** .213***
(.062) (.062) (.062) (.063) (.076) (.077)
Machine operator .292*** .287*** .291*** .238*** .400*** .380***
(.072) (.072) (.072) (.073) (.087) (.089)
Elementary worker .327*** .325*** .321*** .286*** .338*** .299***
(.065) (.065) (.065) (.067) (.084) (.085)
Income
Reference category: Family income Q5
Family income Q1 .734*** .733*** .730*** .648*** .779*** .700***
(.050) (.051) (.051) (.053) (.065) (.066)
Family income Q2 .561*** .564*** .551*** .473*** .728*** .657***
(.046) (.046) (.046) (.047) (.060) (.061)
Family income Q3 .457*** .468*** .462*** .401*** .492*** .442***
(.044) (.044) (.044) (.046) (.058) (.059)
Family income Q4 .262*** .267*** .262*** .219*** .281*** .252***
(.043) (.043) (.043) (.044) (.054) (.055)
Employment status
Self-employed -.213*** -.206*** -.210*** -.210*** -.281*** -.283***
(.042) (.042) (.042) (.043) (.058) (.059)
Publicly employed .241*** .234*** .242*** .246*** .176*** .170***
(.037) (.037) (.037) (.038) (.046) (.047)
Unions
Union membership .244*** .244*** .238*** .236*** .200*** .215***
(.036) (.036) (.036) (.037) (.047) (.048)
Demographic characteristics
Female .217*** .213*** .213*** .215*** .321*** .312***
(.031) (.031) (.031) (.031) (.039) (.039)
Age .001 -.001 .001 -.004 .018** .016**
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.008) (.008)
Age-sq/100 .003 .005 .004 .009 -.013* -.013*
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.008) (.008)
Married -.004 -.006 -.002 -.001 .014 .026
(.032) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.041) (.042)
Religion
Church attendance .003
(.008)
Reference category: No religion
To be continued next page. . .
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Table 6: Preferences for redistribution (binary): pooled country
(cont’)
Binary logit [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Catholic .019
(.045)
Protestant -.092**
(.044)
Other religion .037
(.055)
Social class
Reference category: Middle class
Upper class -.274***
(.037)
Lower class .018
(.036)
Social Mobility
Job prestige .053
(.037)
Reference category: No mobility
Upward mobility -.206***
(.043)
Downward mobility .284***
(.048)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Obs 31423 30852 30938 29891 17489 17199
Pseudo R-Squared .108 .109 .109 .111 .122 .127
Log Pseudolikelihood -15614.3 -15311.0 -15352.5 -14769.1 -9664.5 -9445.8
Chi 2 3100.61 3065.65 3061.11 3053.65 2187.48 2226.23
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Models [1] to [4] based on ISSP 2006, and models [5] and [6] based on ISSP 1999
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B Summary Statistics
Table 7: Summary statistics
Variable n % N
Government’s responsibility to reduce income differences?
Definitely should not be 3539 7.72 45835
Probably should not be 7258 15.84 45835
Probably should be 15336 33.46 45835
Definitely should not be 19702 42.98 45835
Government should reduce income differences? (ISSP 1999)
Strongly disagree 1481 4.83 30684
Disagree 3598 11.73 30684
Neither agree nor disagree 4615 15.04 30684
Agree 11137 36.30 30684
Strongly agree 9853 32.11 30684
Occupation
Manager 3619 9.04 40046
Professional 5360 13.38 40046
Associate professional 5579 13.93 40046
Clerk 4449 11.11 40046
Service worker 5973 14.92 40046
Agricultural worker 1723 4.30 40046
Craftsman 5196 12.98 40046
Machine operator 3196 7.98 40046
Elementary worker 4951 12.36 40,046
Income
Family income Q1 9870 24.60 40114
Family income Q2 8358 20.84 40114
Family income Q3 7601 18.95 40114
Family income Q4 6993 17.43 40114
Family income Q5 7292 18.18 40114
Employment status
Self-employed 6440 13.71 46982
Publicly employed 11355 24.17 46982
Unions
Union membership 16443 34.90 47110
Demographic characteristics
Female 25998 53.88 48253
Married 27007 56.30 47966
Religion
Catholic 17484 37.00 47252
Protestant 10886 23.04 47252
Other religion 8713 18.44 47252
No religion 10169 21.52 47252
Church attendance
Never 13110 27.85 47078
Less frequently 6458 13.72 47078
Once a year 4533 9.63 47078
Several times a year 8197 17.41 47078
Once a month 2529 5.37 47078
2-3 times a month 3157 6.71 47078
Once a week 9094 19.32 47078
Social class
To be continued next page. . .
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Table 7: Summary statistics (cont’)
Variable n % N
Upper class 9019 19.89 45354
Lower class 15871 34.99 45354
Middle class 20464 45.12 45354
Social mobility (ISSP 1999)
Job prestige > father 12335 39.37 31334
Upward mobility 8891 28.97 30686
Downward mobility 10560 34.41 30686
No mobility 11235 36.61 30686
Country
AU-Australia 2765 5.72 48324
CA-Canada 927 1.92 48324
CL-Chile 1499 3.10 48324
TW-Taiwan 1939 4.01 48324
HR-Croatia 1193 2.47 48324
CZ-Czech Republic 1192 2.47 48324
DK-Denmark 1356 2.81 48324
DO-Dominican Republic 2092 4.33 48324
FI-Finland 1180 2.44 48324
FR-France 1791 3.71 48324
DE-Germany 1628 3.37 48324
(incl. East Germany) 527 1.09 48324
HU-Hungary 1001 2.07 48324
IE-Ireland 997 2.06 48324
IL-Israel 1324 2.74 48324
(incl. Israel -Arabs) 306 0.63 48324
JP-Japan 1230 2.55 48324
KR-South Korea 1599 3.31 48324
LV-Latvia 1066 2.21 48324
NL-Netherlands 982 2.03 48324
NZ-New Zealand 1259 2.61 48324
NO-Norway 1320 2.73 48324
PH-Philippines 1198 2.48 48324
PL-Poland 1290 2.67 48324
PT-Portugal 1828 3.78 48324
RU-Russia 2393 4.95 48324
SI-Slovenia 996 2.06 48324
ZA-South Africa 2939 6.08 48324
ES-Spain 2500 5.17 48324
SE-Sweden 1191 2.46 48324
CH-Switzerland 996 2.06 48324
GB-Great Britain 924 1.91 48324
US-United States 1504 3.11 48324
UY-Uruguay 1025 2.12 48324
VE-Venezuela 1200 2.48 48324
Mean Std. Dev. N
Age (17 to 96 years old) 46 17.45 48087
Main source: ISSP 2006 - Role of government IV.
Additional source: ISSP 1999 - Social Inequality III (where indicated).
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